Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Decisions in Art. 78 Proceedings

Article 78 Litigation Documents

September 2021

Decision in Art. 78 proceeding - Maida, John (2009-12-04)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd

Recommended Citation
"Decision in Art. 78 proceeding - Maida, John (2009-12-04)" (2021). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/255

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Article 78 Litigation Documents at FLASH:
The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Decisions in Art. 78
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For
more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Matter of Maida v Evans
2009 NY Slip Op 32974(U)
December 4, 2009
Supreme Court, Albany County
Docket Number: 6158-09
Judge: George B. Ceresia
Republished from New York State Unified Court
System's E-Courts Service.
Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for
any additional information on this case.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.

[* 1]

STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of JOHN MAIDA,
Petitioner,
-againstANDREA D. EVANS, Chair of the
New York State Division of Parole,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-09-ST0570 Index No. 6 158-09
Appearances :

John Maida
Inmate No. 83-B-1881
Petitioner, Pro Se
Marcy Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 3600
Marcy, NY 13402-3600
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Adam W. Silverman,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

'I he petitioner, an inmate at Marcy Correctional Facility. commenced the instant

CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated September 23,
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2008 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving a term of
fifteen years to life on a conviction of murder in the second degree. He was sentenced in July
1983. This is his seventh appearance before the Parole Board. Among the arguments set

forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board relied upon incorrect
information in petitioner’s prison records which in his words “demonstrat[ed] their focus on
a hate crime”. The incorrect information is with respect to his race/ethnicity, which was
listed on the Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) website as Black, when he is
actually Caucasian.’ He argues that he has been the victim of racial profiling extending as
far back as his criminal prosecution. The petitioner maintains that his prison record
incorrectly mentions a post-conviction assault in 1989. He argues that the Parole Board took
an adversarial position to him during the parole interview. As a part of this argument he
asserts that the inmate status report incorrectly indicates that the District Attorney provided
an “official statement” with respect to his release.2 The petitioner further contends that the
Parole Board improperly considered a letter from Blue Knights Motorcycle Club. He
criticizes the Parole Board for being biased against him.
The petitioner argues that the Parole Board’s decision is not supported by fact in that
there is no evidence to support its conclusion that his release is incompatible with the welfare
of society, or that his release would tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense
and undermine respect for the law. The petitioner asserts that the Parole Board failed to
I

The respondent informs the Court that this has since been corrected.

’The petitioner ipdicates that while the nictrirt 4ttnmt.y 0,yrqrently - v w t P 7 !etter
opposing his release in 2001, no letter was received from the District Attorney in connection with

petitioner’s 2008 re-appearance before the Parole Board.
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adequately consider his institutional accomplishments. He maintains that the Parole Board
improperly considered his prior history of drug use, and that this violated the Americans With
Disabilities Act (E 42 USCS 5 12201 et seq.) and the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States and New York State Constitution. As a part of the foregoing argument he points out
that he has taken and completed the ASAT (Alcohol and Substance Abuse) program. He
maintains that his drug addiction is a disability, and that he is being discriminated against by
reason of his disability. The petitioner contends that the Parole Board failed to consider the
proper statutory factors, and also considered impermissible factors, in reaching its
determination. As a part of the latter argument he points out that he earned his GED degree
while incarcerated; that he has received college credits; and that his inmate record includes
many vocational and therapeutic achievements. He indicates that he has received numerous
letters in support of his release, that he has a family and job waiting for him. He maintains
that the Parole Board improperly gave too much weight to the crime for which he is
incarcerated, to the exclusion of all other factors. In his view, the Parole Board undertook
to re-sentence him to another term of imprisonment.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“Denied 24 months. Next appearance September 20 10.
Following a careful review and deliberation of your record and
interview, this panel concludes that discretionary release is not
presently warranted due to concern for the public safety and
welfare. The following factors were properly weighed and
considered. Your instant offense in Yonkers, in January, 1982
involved your fatally stabbing a male victim. Your criminal
history reflects a prior weapon related ofiense. Your
institutional programming demonstrates progress and
3

[* 4]

achievement which is noted to your credit. Your disciplinary
record reflects one Tier 3 report. You have served SHU time.
Your discretionary release, at this time, would thus not be
compatible with the welfare of society at large, and would tend
to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense and
undermine respect for the law.”
As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
rcprrccntntive [I” (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Mattqr of C n l l ~ d nv V e w Ynrk %?te Divisivn of Pm-ole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,
200 13). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,

the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
buprsi). Furrilemore, only a ’showingof irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part
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of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of P e w v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon
release. During the parole interview Parole Commissioner Ludlow read extensively from the
minutes of petitioner’s sentencing. In addition, Commissioner Ludlow read from a very
favorable letter received from the sentencing judge (which recommended that the petitioner
be released). The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons
for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter

of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept.,
19941; Matter of G r w i L.

~

G

1Wuih SLdlC Uivi&ii ~l I ’ d l U k , 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept.,

19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of
the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (seeMatter of Weir v. New York State Division
of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board
of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept.,
1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629
[3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The
5
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Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Wise v New York State p k q i o n of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of
Executive Law $ 259-i (2) (c) (A) (_see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Marrcr u l I)uiiu
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~
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of Parole, 3

AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board,

227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; M a i i ~ r o t,rew\
i
v

~ i e x ork
f
b r ~ h~xt.cutivc
g

Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 1 14, 11 15 [3rdDept.,
6
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20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of

Co_dv&~ennisi,

33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];

Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates

of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that
Executive Law

8 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate

expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated
by the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny parole (seeBarna v Travis, 239 F3d
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v
Hammock,605 F2d661,664 [2dCir., 1979];PaunettovHammock, 516F Supp 1367,13671368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76,
supra. Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court,
accordingly, finds no due process violation.
With respect to petitioner’s equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment
ofthe Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within theirjurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable
7
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classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 45 1 US 648,68
1 Fd 26 514, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [1981]). Where the action under review does not involve

a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murj-zia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d
protection clause (g,
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (seeGiordano v City of New
York, 274 F3d 740,751 [2ndCir., 20011). In addition, because "New York courts addressing
a state equal protection claim will ordinarily afford the same breadth of coverage conferred
by federal courts under the US Constitution in the same or similar matters" (Brown v State
of New York, 45 AD3d 15, 20-21 [2007 [3rdDept., 2007]? quoting Brown v State of New
York, 9 AD3d 23,27 [2004]), the Court discerns no violation of NY Const art 1 0 1 1. The
Court finds the argument to have no merit.
The Parole Boards decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)
is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta v State
of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604).
Petitioner's argument with respect to the alleged erroneous information concerning
his race and/or ethnicity, posted on the DOCS website, has no merit. There is no evidence
that members of the Parole Board had viewed and/or were liware of the incorrect entry. In
addition, the inmate status report correctly indicated petitioner's race. Lastly there is no
indication in either the Parole Board determination, or in the transcript of the parole

8
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interview, that the petitioner's race and/or ethnicity factored into the determination, or that
the Parole Commissioners viewed petitioner's murderous assault as a hate crime.
To the extent that petitioner alleges that his inmate record contains inaccurate
information, that claim is not the proper subject of this proceeding. Petitioner's challenge to
the accuracy of his institutional records should be made pursuant to the procedures set forth
in 7 NYCRR part 5

(see Matter of Salahuddin v Goord, 64 AD3d

1091, 1092 [3rdDept.,

20091; Matter of Rivera v Joy, 50 AD3d 1333, 1334 [3rdDept., 20081; Maxnf Rivet-a v

Selsky, 49 AD3d 11 15, 1 115 [3rdDept., 20081)
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions, including
those under the Americans With Disabilities Act and finds them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
9
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entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.
ENTER

Dated:

December 4,2009
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.

2.

Order To Show Cause dated July 24, 2009, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated September 22,2009, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
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